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Abstract 
 
Courts, Campaigns, and Corruption: An Empirical Evaluation of the 
“Appearance of Corruption” Rationale for Campaign Finance 
Regulation 
 
Nitya Tangada Rao, M. A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2016 
 
Supervisor:  Brian E. Roberts 
Co-Supervisor:  Daron R. Shaw  
 
In Buckley v. Valeo, arguably their most important campaign finance decision, the 
United States Supreme Court argued that the appearance of political corruption alone 
might be sufficient to undermine the health of a representative democracy.  There has 
been little empirical evidence to support this assertion, so to test this hypothesis, I fielded 
a novel survey containing different measures of factors influencing perceptions of 
corruption, perceptions about campaign contributions, support for campaign finance 
reform initiatives, perceptions of the frequency and nature of corruption, and perceptions 
of democratic health to roughly 1000 participants on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.  I 
constructed a causal diagram representing the "appearance of corruption" rationale in 
Buckley v. Valeo and used structural equation modeling, observed-variable path modeling 
to evaluate that specific causal hypothesis with various survey items.  I found that the 
data did not support the hypotheses derived from the appearance of corruption rationale.  
 v 
 
To further test the Supreme Court’s claim that perceptions of corruption affect political 
behavior, I regressed various measures of perceptions of the frequency of corruption on 
self-reported political participation and found no significant correlation, again suggesting 
that the appearance of corruption rationale has meager empirical support. 
 vi 
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 In his book The Costs of Democracy, Alexander Heard argues that a government 
should regulate money more strictly than other campaign resources because it “is a 
universal, transferable unit infinitely more flexible in its uses than the time, or ideas, or 
talent, or influence, or controlled votes that also constitute contributions to politics” 
(Heard 1960: 3).  He speaks to a broad debate within political science about the nature 
and scope of equality-based considerations in a democracy and about the need and basis 
for attempts to equalize political clout between political actors (Bailey 1998; Cain 1995).  
On one end of the spectrum, researchers and politicians argue that campaign messages 
have a quantifiable impact on voters.  Specifically, campaigns have an incentive to 
advertise their platforms and inform voters, and thus campaign spending is simply a way 
to increase the amount of information available to citizens (Brubaker 1998; Palda 1994; 
Smith 1996; Smith 1999; Coleman and Manna 2000).  Furthermore, increased campaign 
spending allows for more outreach, which should presumably make for more energized 
and more informed voters (Jacobson 1992, 114–32; Kenny and McBurnett 1997; Baron 
1994; Ansolabehere and Gerber 1994; Freedman, Franz, and Golstein 2004).  Similarly, 
direct or face-to-face contact has been shown to be the most effective form of campaign 
outreach, yet campaigns often choose less expensive options (Gerber and Green 2000; 
Niemi and Weisberg 2001).  Therefore, more campaign spending might in fact result in 
greater turnout and also increase political participation (Malbin and Gais 1998).  This 
offers a basis for the argument that increased spending can equalize the playing field by 
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granting campaigns more resources with which to reach out to voters (Bailey 1995). 
Lastly, critics of stern campaign finance regulations argue that such reforms often have 
broad and unforeseeable impacts on the political landscape and that more regulations 
might simply result in more violations (Carey, Niemi, and Powell 2000; Fiorina 1980; 
Garret and Smith 2005; Herrick 2003).  
 Those on the other side of this debate paint a less rosy picture of money in 
politics, arguing that the main focus of campaigns is victory and that informing citizens is 
not a necessary or even common byproduct of that endeavor (Dworkin 1996; Ferguson 
1995; Werthheimer and Manes 1994).  In this same vein, some political scientists have 
argued that stricter campaign finance regulations should raise aggregate levels of trust in 
the government and consequently bolster the democratic process (Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse 1995; Weber 1999; Goidel, Gross, and Shields 1999).  More specifically, there 
have been attempts to construct a theoretical link between low levels of civic engagement 
or political participation and poor opinions of political efficacy (Brehm and Rahn 1997).  
In short, one forceful argument in favor of harsher campaign finance regulation contends 
that democracies have a strong interest in reducing the appearance of corruption because 
those appearances alone can corrupt the democratic process (Thompson 1993).  The 
Supreme Court has used this argument—hereafter referred to as the appearance of 
corruption rationale—as its justification for limits on individual campaign contributions, 
but there exists little public opinion data validating this specific argument. 
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THE APPEARANCE OF CORRUPTION RATIONALE 
 In their landmark 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo, the Burger court upheld a 
provision in the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) 
limiting the amount that an individual could contribute to a campaign.  In a per curiam 
decision, the Supreme Court justices held that the government was justified in restricting 
“large campaign contributions” because of their compelling interest in “the prevention of 
corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive 
influence of large financial contributions on candidates' positions and on their actions if 
elected to office” (424 U.S. 1).  The Supreme Court then argued that “to the extent that 
large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential 
office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined” 
(424 U.S. 1).  In representative government, voters should have every confidence that 
their preferences exert the strongest influence on elected officials’ actions, but the Court 
argued that large campaign contributions suggest to voters that legislators are more 
concerned with those donors’ interests.  Most importantly, the Court indicated that this 
appearance of corruption alone can prompt a behavioral change in voters.  In short, the 
rationale for limits on campaign contributions first set forth in Buckley v. Valeo holds that 
politicians might systematically grant campaign donors political favors in exchange for 
their contributions, and the mere threat or likelihood of that form of corruption is enough 
to corrupt the democratic process (Sullivan 1998; BeVier 1994; Persily and Lammie 
2004).  
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A primary concern that arises from the appearance of corruption rationale 
questions its reliance on public opinion writ large (Souraf 1986).  Citing public opinion 
data as evidence is common practice; examples can be found in Daggett v. Commission 
on Governmental Ethics and Election Practices (205 F.3d 445), Montana Right to Life 
Association v. Eddleman (999 F. Supp. 1380), Homans v. City of Albuquerque (217 F. 
Supp. 2d 1197), and McConnell v. FEC (540 U.S. 93) (Persily and Lammie 2004).  These 
opinions all offer surveys indicating that a majority of respondents find campaign donors 
exert undue influence on the legislative process as evidence of the destructive properties 
of the appearance of corruption, rather than any commentary on proven incidences of 
actual corruption.  However, actual corruption is a muddy concept and therefore difficult 
to measure, and sparse empirical evidence links campaign contributions to legislative 
decisions (BeVier 1994; Coleman and Manna 2000; Persily and Lammie 2004; 
Ansolabehere, Snowberg, and Snyder 2005).  A small number of studies have shown that 
incumbents embroiled in corruption scandals often get less than their expected vote share, 
but corruption allegations have not been shown to diminish overall turnout (Peters and 
Welch 1980; Welch and Hibbing 1997).  Ansolabehere and Persily (2008) found no 
relationship between electoral participation or the stringency of voter identification laws 
and perceptions of the incidence of vote fraud, suggesting that there is not a strong 
relationship between actual incidences of corruption and the public’s perceptions of 
corruption.  With these problems in mind, a number of scholars have expressed concern 
that the appearance of corruption argument might allow the court to skirt difficult 
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empirical questions by citing public opinion polls instead of delving into data on actual 
corruption (Ansolabehere and Persily 2008; Persily and Lammie 2004). 
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CAMPAIGNS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND CORRUPTION 
The specific appearance of corruption rationale put forth in Buckley v. Valeo 
places perceptions of corruption as causally prior to opinions of democratic health and 
focuses on the presence of those perceptions in the citizenry at large.  Furthermore, the 
relationship specified in the appearance of corruption rationale is a two-step process.  
First, citizens observing large campaign contributions perceive greater levels of 
corruption in government.  Those perceptions of corruption then cause those citizens to 
withdraw from the democratic process.  The first difficulty associated with an empirical 
test of the appearance of corruption rationale concerns the challenges of introducing 
perceptions of money in politics into public opinion polls.  Most voters rank campaign 
finance reform as a low priority (Primo 2002).   Secondly, both the media and citizens 
wildly overestimate the amount of money in politics (Ansolabehere, Snowberg, and 
Snyder 2005; Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose 2000).  Citizens also do not link the size of a 
donation to the amount of influence it may offer (Persily and Lammie 2004).  
Furthermore, citizens who contribute to campaigns are fundamentally unlike those who 
do not donate regularly in that they are more likely to participate in other ways 
(Ansolabehere, de Figueredo, and Snyder 2003; Ansolabehere, Snowberg, and Snyder 
2005).  Taken together, these results suggest that those who do donate regularly might 
look at campaign spending differently and that, broadly speaking, the public is not well 
informed about the role of money in politics.   
As additional evidence for the latter point, a handful of aggregate-level studies 
have failed to find a relationship between amounts of campaign spending in federal 
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elections and levels of trust in the federal government (Primo 2002; Primo and Milyo 
2006; Coleman and Manna 2000). Furthermore, changes in perceptions of corruption at 
the aggregate level do not seem to result from changes in campaign finance regulation, 
and the portion of public that perceives the government as corrupt has decreased as the 
amount of soft money contributions has increased dramatically (Persily and Lammie 
2004).  This again suggests that the public is neither well-informed about money in 
politics nor attentive to changes in campaign finance regulations and does not perceive a 
clear link between large campaign contributions and incidences of corruption in 
government. Furthermore, research suggests that perceptions of corruption can be tied to 
demographic characteristics, marginalization, presidential approval ratings, economic 
evaluations, anti-government attitudes, and inherent beliefs about trustworthiness of other 
people (Persily and Lammie 2004; Coleman and Manna 2000; Rahn, Brehm, and Carlson 
1999).  In short, empirical evidence suggests that the mass public’s conception of 
political corruption does not cleanly map on to the Court’s definition.  
To further complicate matters, the Supreme Court has so far offered meager 
guidance as to what precisely political corruption might entail.  In Buckley v. Valeo, the 
Court offered a vague definition of corruption as an interaction resembling a quid pro quo 
exchange, asserting that “to the extent that large contributions are given to secure a 
political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our 
system of representative democracy is undermined” (424 U.S. 1).  However, in their 
claim that “laws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal with only the most 
blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action,” the 
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Court makes clear that these exchanges are not limited to bribery (424 U.S. 1).  With 
regard to corporate contributions, the concept of corruption was later expanded in Austin 
v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce to cover “the corrosive and distorting effects of 
immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form 
and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the corporation's political 
ideas” (494 U.S. 652).  This particular conception of political corruption deviates quite 
sharply from the notion of an improper exchange arising from an individual’s campaign 
contributions.  Recently however, in Citizens United v. FEC, the Court returned to its 
original definition of corruption as quid pro quo relationships between political actors and 
their monetary supporters (558 U.S. 310; Kang 2011).  Thus a significant portion of the 
measurement challenge posed by evaluating the appearance of corruption rationale has its 
roots in the Court’s own vague and widely varying definition of political corruption.    
The second stage of the appearance of corruption rationale posits a negative 
correlation between these perceptions of corruption and democratic health.  In this vein, a 
number of studies have attempted to discern the relationship between perceptions of 
corruption and other political activities.  Disclosure of campaign contributions is one 
commonly used safeguard against corruption, yet studies have found that disclosure has 
little impact on measures of political participation (Carpenter and Milyo 2012; Sullivan 
1998).  More similar to the appearance of corruption rationale are a handful of studies 
that found no relationship between varying state campaign finance laws and perceptions 
of corruption (Persily and Lammie 2004; Primo and Milyo 2006; Rosenson 2009).  
Though slightly different measures than those put forth in the appearance of corruption 
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rationale, a number of large-scale studies have failed to find a relationship between trust 
in government and voter turnout (Citrin 1974; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Citrin and 
Luks 2001).  Similarly, researchers have found no relationship between campaign 
spending levels and perceptions of political efficacy or levels of trust in government 
(Lipset and Schneider 1987; Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997).  Primo and Milyo (2006) 
found no relationship between disclosure, contribution limits, and public financing and 
trust in government.  In short, the existing literature also fails to support the second step 
of the appearance of corruption rationale.  More critically, no study so far has aimed to 
test the precise two-step argument put forth in the appearance of corruption rationale.   
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SURVEY DESIGN 
 This analysis used novel data from a survey conducted on Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (MTurk) during August and September 2015.  MTurk is an online labor market 
largely populated by workers from the United States and India (Paolacci and Chandler 
2014).  Workers are compensated for performing tasks that they elect to complete.  Due 
to this self-selection, sample composition is unpredictable (Malhotra and Krosnick 2007).  
A number of factors, including rate of compensation, the frequency with which task is 
listed, task complexity, and the time task is listed, can influence sample composition 
(Chandler, Mueller, and Paolacci 2014).  Significantly, there has been no relationship 
found between response quality and compensation for surveys involving subjective 
responses (Buhrmester et al. 2011; Marge, Banerjee, and Rudnicky 2010; Mason and 
Watts 2009).  Past studies have suggested that MTurk workers are younger, more liberal, 
more highly educated, and less religious than the American citizenry (Berinsky, Huber, 
and Lenz 2012; Paolacci et al. 2010; Shapiro, Chandler, and Mueller 2013). Furthermore, 
psychological testing suggests that MTurk workers experience higher levels of social 
anxiety, social introversion, and emotional instability than the larger population 
(Goodman, Cryder, and Cheema 2013; Shapiro, et al. 2013).  Despite these differences, a 
number of studies have suggested that MTurk samples are similar to other samples in 
regard to representativeness (Chandler, Mueller, and Paolacci 2014; Berinsky, Huber, and 
Lenz 2012; Buhrmester, Kwang, and Gosling 2011).   
The survey was constructed in Qualtrics and then listed on the Mechanical Turk 
labor market between August 20, 2015 and September 24, 2015.  Only workers with a 
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prior overall approval rate greater than or equal to 90% and more than 500 previously 
approved task completions were permitted to complete the survey.  All workers took the 
survey over the Internet, and the survey was only administered in English.  Survey items 
were randomized and presented to the respondent one at a time.  With size of 1,008 
respondents, the median age of this study’s sample was 36 years, and the median yearly 
income was between $40,000 and $49,999.  Fifty-four percent of the respondents were 
female.  With respect to party identification, 51% of respondents identified as Democrats, 
28% as Republican, and 21% as Independents.  Seventy-six percent of respondents 
identified as Caucasian, 9% as African-American, 7% as Hispanic, 6% as Asian-
American, and 2% as other.  
The survey instrument itself contained 36 substantive questions and 10 
demographic questions and included distinct measures of four factors known to influence 
attitudes toward corruption: socioeconomic status, predispositions to trust, strength of 
anti-government attitudes, and national evaluations.   It also contained distinct measures 
of perceptions about campaign contributions, support for campaign finance reform 
initiatives, perceptions of the frequency and nature of corruption, and perceptions of 
democratic health.  The full survey instrument is reproduced in Appendix A.   
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CHALLENGES IN CAUSAL ANALYSES 
The appearance of corruption rationale contains a causal hypothesis insofar as it 
specifies temporal priorities and associations between variables (Davis 1985; Sobel 
1995).  Specifically, the rationale suggests perceptions about campaign contributions 
affect perceptions of political corruption, which in turn affect perceptions of democratic 
health and political behavior.  Thus the richness of the Supreme Court’s causal claims 
necessitates a structural framework.  Evaluating individual relationships drawn from the 
hypothesis in isolation does not accurately capture the nature of the Court’s complex 
claims.  Structural equation modeling is widely used to evaluate causal hypotheses and, 
unlike regression, allows for causal inferences; the researcher assumes causal 
relationships between particular variables and outlines those relationships in path diagram 
and/or a series of equations.  While the resulting path coefficients and model fit statistics 
cannot establish causation, they can be interpreted as representative of causal effects even 
when the data used is strictly observational (Pearl 2012, Duncan 1975, Wright 1921).  
Similar to regression coefficients, path coefficients indicate the direct effect of a 
particular variable on another variable; more clearly, a path coefficient of 0.5 implies that 
a one-unit increase in the independent variable results in a half-unit increase in the 
dependent variable.  It is important to note that the lack of a causal relationship in the 
assumed model indicates a hypothesized path coefficient of zero.  
In addition to the challenges associated with evaluating complex causal 
hypotheses, public opinion data is often difficult to analyze.  Survey results frequently 
contain missing data and categorical and thus non-normal data.  Common sources of non-
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normality include outliers, skewness, and shorter or longer tails.  One approach to dealing 
with non-normal data uses standardization, but this typically discards valuable 
information contained in the dataset.  Transforming categorical data, on the other hand, 
requires strong assumptions about the equidistance of consecutive categories in the 
ordinal scale.  Lastly, categorical data frequently deviate from normality.  Structural 
equation modeling is more robust to these data problems than regression models.  
Furthermore, categorical regression outputs are often difficult to interpret and highly 
sensitive to the coding system used.  Therefore, analyzing the appearance of corruption 
rationale calls for an approach that is both capable of accurately modeling complex 
causal relationships and robust to violations of the assumption of multivariate normality.  
This paper is the first to examine the Supreme Court’s appearance of corruption rationale 
in a holistic way and to offer solutions to methodological challenges raised by that 
analysis. 
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EVALUATING MEASUREMENT  
Because the American citizenry does not have well-informed attitudes toward the 
campaign finance system, it is reasonable to assume that these attitudes might be 
sensitive to measurement.  More specifically, our survey measures are mostly accurately 
thought of as observed indicators of some underlying construct.  Thus the variable 
categories corresponding to a respondent’s opinions map onto a continuous latent scale 
reflecting a particular attitude.  In addition, the different measures of the relevant 
attitudes account for the potential for changing definitions of political corruption from the 
Supreme Court.  To be clear, the distinct measures of each attitude contained in the 
survey instrument first allow for an especially expansive interpretation of the concept of 
corruption, producing a more robust and inclusive test of the Court’s claims; this is 
particularly necessary in light of the Court’s vague definition of political corruption and 
that definition’s weak relationship with the mass public’s conception of corruption.  
Second, these distinct indicators also allow for tests of the stability and sensitivity of 
those various survey measures. 
All responses were coded to a positive valence, and exogenous variables with less 
than five categories were labeled as ordered variables.  Ordinal variables with five or 
more categories can be treated as continuous variables (Babakus, Ferguson, & Jöreskog 
1987; Dolan 1994; Johnson & Creech 1983; Hutchinson & Olmos 1998).  Race was 
recoded as a dummy variable with a response of “Caucasian” corresponding to one.  
Similarly, the income and education variables were collapsed to a five-point scale, and 
the socioeconomic status variable was collapsed into a four-point scale.  Age was recoded 
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by decade into a seven-point scale, and a new political participation variable was 
produced by summing responses to individual questions concerning specific activities.  
Appendix C shows the univariate distributions of the variables included in the following 
models.  The skewed distributions reveal that most variables are not normally distributed.  
In light of past research on attitudes toward political corruption and money in politics, 
these heavily skewed distributions are to be expected.  If skewness is greater than two or 
kurtosis is greater than seven, non-normality can impact results (Curran, West, and Finch 
1995). 
Most survey responses contain missing data points.  To facilitate statistical 
analysis, we assume that the data is missing at random (MAR); under this assumption, the 
probability that a data point is missing is dependent on the observed data but not the 
missing data.  Listwise and pairwise deletion not only reduce sample size but are also 
more appropriate when dealing with that data that is missing completely at random (often 
an unreasonably strong assumption when dealing with real data).  With regard to 
structural models, MAR data are often best dealt with through either full information 
maximum likelihood estimation (FIMLE) or data imputation.  To manage missing data, 
entries with less than one-fourth of questions answered were discarded to produce a 
dataset of 957 respondents.  The missing responses were then imputed using the 
“Amelia” package in the R statistical software.  To ensure that imputation did not bias 
results, another dataset in which entries with less than three-fourths of questions 
completed was also created; this dataset contained 931 observations and was also subject 
to data imputation.  All models were run on both datasets and produced nearly identical 
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results.  Thus one possible method for determining the final models’ robustness to 
imputation is to perform multiple imputation on various subsets of the larger dataset. 
Lastly, we used confirmatory factor analysis to gauge the fit of the measurement 
model and to determine if particular indicators are querying the desired attitudes.  Thus, 
the measurement model was also tested independently of the structural model to gauge 
the validity of the latent variables.  In accordance with the design of the survey items, 
parallel analysis using the “psych” package in R suggests eight factors in the data matrix 
(Horn 1965).  Fit indices (Table 1) from a confirmatory factor analysis suggest that the 
observed variables, as currently grouped, do not map well on the factors, indicating that 
questions that were thought to be measuring the same underlying attitude do not seem to 
fit together in a latent construct.  Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) might offer another 
picture of the relationship between indicators.  Though EFA is unlikely to provide 
substantial theoretical confirmation, it could suggest which indicators covary to a 
significant extent.  Table 1 lists that fit indices for a principal axes exploratory factor 
analysis using polychoric correlations (as appropriate with categorical data).  The EFA fit 
indices also reveal a relatively poor fit for the produced model, indicating that the 
constructed factors do not fit the data well.  Table 2 lists the variables associated with 
each factor.  
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Table 1. Fit statistics for confirmatory and exploratory measurement models. 
Fit Statistic EFA CFA 
Comparative Fit Index - 0.638 
Tucker-Lewis Index 0.798 0.606 
RMSEA 0.069 0.082 
RMSEA Lower CI 0.066 0.080 
RMSEA Upper CI 0.071 0.084 
RMSEA p-value 0.000 0.000 
SRMR - 0.112 
AIC - 81273.581 
BIC -961.12 81446.033 
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Table 2. Composition of factors. 
Factor Indicators 
Socioeconomic 
Status 
Select the option that contains your yearly income. 
What is the highest degree you have received? 
Select the option that best identifies your race. 
If you had to make a choice, how would you describe your current 
socio-economic status? 
Predisposition to 
Trust 
How often can other people be trusted? 
Do you think your representatives’ actions are always honest and 
ethical? 
Does the federal government waste tax money?  
How often can you trust the federal government to act in the benefit 
of all citizens? 
Please select the option that best identifies your partisan affiliation. 
Strength of Anti-
Government 
Attitudes 
Do you think that the federal government is mostly concerned with a 
few powerful interests or with the welfare of all citizens? 
How many people in the federal government are corrupt? 
Do you think that elections cause the federal government to attention 
to what citizens think? 
How would you evaluate the amount of money you have to pay in 
taxes? 
How would you describe your political ideology? 
National 
Evaluations 
How would you evaluate President Obama’s performance? 
How would you describe the current state of the country’s economy? 
How do you think the country’s economy has changed in the past 
year? 
How do you think the country’s economy will change in the next 
twelve months? 
Perceptions of 
Campaign 
Contributions 
To what extent do you consider the amount of money a candidate has 
raised when deciding whether or not to vote for them? 
To what extent do you consider the sources of a candidate’s 
campaign funds when deciding whether or not to vote for them? 
What percentage of the average US Senate candidate’s funds do you 
think come from interest groups? 
What percentage of the average US Senate candidate’s funds do you 
think come from individual contributions? 
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Table 2. Composition of factors. 
Factor Indicators 
Perceptions 
of the 
Frequency 
of Political 
Corruption 
How often do you think that corruption occurs within the US Congress? 
Which group or factor would you identify as the primary influence on a 
Congressman’s actions? 
How often do you think that Congressmen give extra time or consideration 
to campaign contributors? 
How much of the time can you trust the federal government to do what is 
right? 
What priority do you think should be given to reforms aimed at reducing 
corruption in the US Congress? 
Perceptions 
of the 
Campaign 
Finance 
Regulation 
How much would you support a reform that limits candidates for federal 
office to campaign funds from a public financing system? 
How much would you support a reform that mandates full disclosure but 
allows unlimited campaign contributions by individuals? 
How much would you support a reform that prohibits third parties from 
spending money on campaign communications? 
What priority would you assign to campaign finance reform? 
How would you evaluate the current system of campaign finance 
regulation in the U.S.? 
How would you evaluate your support for the current campaign finance 
regulations that permit third-parties affiliated with a campaign to spend 
unlimited amounts of money on campaign advertisements? 
Do you think that campaign contributions are a form of free speech 
protected by the First Amendment? 
Do you think that one political party benefits more from the current system 
of campaign finance regulation than another? 
Democratic 
Health 
Do you think the country is headed in the right or wrong direction? 
To what extent do you think that the federal government responds to the 
wants and needs of people like you? 
Have you participated in any of the following activities over the past four 
years? 
Do substantial campaign contributions from individuals unduly influence 
elected officials’ actions? 
Do substantial campaign contributions from interest groups unduly 
influence elected officials’ actions? 
Do all citizens have an equal ability to impact an election, or do wealthy 
citizens have a greater ability? 
How would you evaluate the impact of money on the electoral process? 
How often do you think that Congress-members look out for the interests 
of special interest groups or wealthy citizens over the interests of all 
citizens? 
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MODEL CONSTRUCTION AND EVALUATION 
Figure 1 shows a structural model depicting the putative causal relationships 
derived from the appearance of corruption rationale using the factors constructed in the 
measurement model.  In the first equation, perceptions of campaign contributions were 
regressed on perceptions of the frequency of corruption.  Additionally, because 
perceptions of corruption can be moderated by a number of attitudes, variables measuring 
socioeconomic status, predisposition to trust, anti-government attitudes, and evaluations 
of presidential performance and the economy were included.  In the second equation, 
perceptions of the frequency of corruption were regressed on perceptions of democratic 
health.  Perceptions of the current system of campaign finance regulations and proposed 
reforms were also included as a control in the second equation (Carpenter and Milyo 
2012; Sullivan 1998).   
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Figure 1. Diagram of causal pathway. 
 
Figure 2 shows the full structural model, including the construction of factors.  
The choice of estimators is of particular importance when using categorical data and/or 
incomplete data.  Categorical data typically requires the mean- and variance-adjusted 
weighted least squares (WLSMV) estimator, but the FIMLE estimator is more robust to 
missing data.  That being said, the WLSMV estimator is especially advantageous when 
variables’ distributions are heavily skewed or when the variable categories are not 
equally sized across a latent continuum.  Thus, the WLSMV estimator is fairly robust 
when a dataset contains more than 200 observations (Flora & Curran 2004; Rhemtulla, 
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Brosseau-Liard, & Savalei 2012).  Because of the large number of categorical variables 
in the data, I elected to perform multiple imputation and then use the WLSMV estimator.  
The models were run in the R statistical software using the “lavaan” package.   
Figure 2. The full structural model. 
 
As an initial check on the robustness of the structural model and to account for the 
influence of measurement, I ran four different path models containing identical items 
representing the four factors known to influence attitudes toward corruption and distinct 
items representing the perceptions about campaign contributions, support for campaign 
finance reform initiatives, perceptions of the frequency and nature of corruption, and 
perceptions of democratic health (Table 3).  Path analyses are a form of structural 
equation models in which observed variables are used in place of factors.  Because latent 
variables account for measurement error, path analyses require stronger assumptions than 
structural models.  Though they highlight data problems, path models, in this instance, 
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allow us to discard poor fit derived from factor construction issues and estimate 
relationships between survey items.  
 
Table 3. Survey items included in each of the four path models. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Socioeconomic 
Status 
If you had to make a choice, how would you describe your current 
socio-economic status? 
Predisposition 
to Trust How often can other people be trusted? 
National 
Evaluations How would you evaluate President Obama’s performance? 
Anti-
Government 
Attitudes 
Do you think that the federal government is mostly concerned with a 
few powerful interests or with the welfare of all citizens? 
Perceptions of 
Campaign 
Donations 
To what extent 
do you consider 
the amount of 
money a 
candidate has 
raised when 
deciding 
whether or not 
to vote for 
them? 
To what extent 
do you consider 
the sources of a 
candidate’s 
campaign funds 
when deciding 
whether or not 
to vote for 
them?  
What 
percentage of 
the average US 
Senate 
candidate’s 
funds do you 
think come 
from interest 
groups?  
What 
percentage of 
the average US 
Senate 
candidate’s 
funds do you 
think come 
from individual 
contributions?  
Perceptions of 
the Frequency 
of Corruption 
How often do 
you think that 
corruption 
occurs within 
the US 
Congress? 
How often do 
you think that 
Congressmen 
give extra time 
or consideration 
to campaign 
contributors? 
How much of 
the time can 
you trust the 
federal 
government to 
do what is 
right? 
What priority 
do you think 
should be given 
to reforms 
aimed at 
reducing 
corruption in 
the US 
Congress? 
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Table 3. Survey items included in each of the four path models. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Perceptions of 
Campaign 
Finance 
Regulations 
Do you think 
that campaign 
contributions 
are a form of 
free speech 
protected by the 
First 
Amendment? 
What priority 
would you 
assign to 
campaign 
finance reform? 
How would you 
evaluate the 
current system 
of campaign 
finance 
regulation in 
the U.S.? 
Do you think 
that one 
political party 
benefits more 
from the 
current system 
of campaign 
finance 
regulation than 
another? 
Perceptions of 
Democratic 
Health 
To what extent 
do you think 
that the federal 
government 
responds to the 
wants and 
needs of people 
like you? 
Do all citizens 
have an equal 
ability to 
impact an 
election, or do 
wealthy citizens 
have a greater 
ability? 
Do you think 
the country is 
headed in the 
right or wrong 
direction? 
Do substantial 
campaign 
contributions 
from 
individuals 
unduly 
influence 
elected 
officials’ 
actions?  
 
Lastly, while the Supreme Court’s particular appearance of corruption rationale 
posits the two-stage process tested above, their fundamental claim is that the appearance 
of corruption affects citizens’ political behavior.  More clearly, citizens who perceive 
high levels of political corruption behave differently in the political sphere from those 
who perceive low levels of political corruption.  Thus, if the Court incorrectly identified 
the moderating factors but correctly identified the outcome, then their justification for 
caps on individual campaign contributions still has heft.  To test the more basic claim that 
perceptions of corruption affect political behavior and to confirm the results of the 
structural model, I first regressed measures of socioeconomic status, predisposition to 
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trust, anti-government attitudes, and national evaluations on the question closest to the 
conception of corruption outlined in Buckley v. Valeo: “How often do you think that 
Congressmen give extra time or consideration to campaign contributors?”  I also included 
gender, race, educational level, income, and ideology as controls.  I then regressed 
responses to that same question and to a measure of perceptions of the current system of 
campaign finance regulation on a self-reported measure of political participation.  In that 
measure, respondents were asked to indicate which political activities they took part in, 
resulting in an additive scale representing the breadth of each respondent’s reported 
political behavior.  I again controlled for gender, race, education level, income, political 
ideology, and in this instance, political interest – all factors known to affect political 
participation.  
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RESULTS 
 Fit estimates for the structural equation model were not satisfactory (Table 3).  To 
indicate a good fit, the comparative fit index (CFI) and Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) should 
be above 0.950 and 0.900 respectively (West, Taylor, and Wu 2012; Bentler 1990).  The 
full structural model produced a CFI of 0.751 and a TLI of 0.690.  The highest produced 
by the four observed-variable path models were a CFI of 0.792 and a TLI of 0.550.  
Furthermore, a root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) below 0.05 suggests a 
good model fit; the full structural model had a RMSEA of 0.072, and the lowest produced 
by the four path models was 0.105 (Browne and Cudeck 1992; MacCallum, Browne, and 
Sugawara 1996).  Furthermore, the four path models produced very different information 
criteria, suggesting that the measures used do have a discernable difference on 
information loss.  Thus we can conclude that, while accounting for the effect of 
measurement, this survey data does not confirm the hypotheses derived from the 
appearance of corruption rationale.  These results are in accord with past literature.  
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Table 3. Measures of fit for structural model and four path models. 
Fit Statistic Full Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Comparative Fit Index 0.715 0.563 0.452 0.792 0.724 
Tucker-Lewis Index 0.690 0.053 -0.188 0.550 0.402 
RMSEA 0.072 0.213 0.140 0.155 0.105 
RMSEA Lower CI 0.070 0.191 0.118 0.134 0.083 
RMSEA Upper CI 0.074 0.236 0.163 0.178 0.128 
RMSEA p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SRMR 0.104 0.080 0.055 0.053 0.043 
AIC 82402.306 15575.749 16593.500 18332.122 18546.106 
BIC 82949.150 15619.218 16636.958 18375.590 18589.555 
 
The first linear regression model produced an adjusted R-squared of 0.3194, 
indicating that the model explained approximately thirty percent of the total variability in 
the dependent variable.  Thus the model failed to explain most of the variation in 
perceptions of the frequency of political corruption.  However, the coefficients lend 
support to existing theories about the influences on perceptions of corruption (Table 4).  
Socioeconomic status (statistically significant at α = 0.10) was negatively correlated with 
perceptions of the frequency of political corruption; as past research indicates, this 
suggests that respondents of lower socioeconomic status are more likely to perceive high 
levels of political corruption.  In this same vein, presidential evaluations (statistically 
significant at α = 0.05) were also negatively correlated with perceptions of the frequency 
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of political corruption, suggesting that those who do not approve of the current 
administration are more likely to perceive it as corrupt.  However, this conclusion is not 
supported by the positive correlation between ideology (statistically significant at α = 
0.05) and perceptions of the frequency of political corruption.  In another deviation from 
past results, race (statistically significant at α = 0.01) was positively correlated with 
perceptions of the frequency of political corruption; other scholars have suggested the 
racial minorities, as members of an out-group, would be more likely to perceive political 
corruption. Lastly, the strength of anti-government attitudes (statistically significant at α 
= 0.01) was the strongest predictor of perceptions of the frequency of political corruption, 
revealing that those who are least trusting of government are most likely to perceive 
corruption.  In total, these results suggest that theories about the mediating factors of 
perceptions of corruption hold up relatively well in this Mturk sample.   
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Table 4. Results of first OLS model. 
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Intercept 1.5430 (0.1162) *** 
Socioeconomic Status -0.0546 (0.0246) * 
Predisposition to Trust -0.0184 (0.0.169) 
Anti-Government Attitudes 0.2821 (0.01648) *** 
National Evaluation -0.0425 (0.0154) ** 
Perceptions of Campaign Donations -0.0025 (0.0217) 
Gender -0.0144 (0.0319) 
Race 0.1259 (0.0377) *** 
Education Level 0.0432 (0.0152) 
Income Level 0.0239 (0.0189) 
Ideology 0.0561 (0.0188) ** 
***p < 0.01    **p < 0.05    *p < 0.10 
 
The second linear regression model produced an extremely low adjusted R-
squared of 0.1713, suggesting that model explained less than twenty percent of the 
variation in political participation.  Perceptions of the frequency of corruption did not 
have a statistically significant effect on political participation.  In fact, the strongest 
predictors were evaluations of the current system of campaign finance regulations and 
political interest, with the latter as the strongest of the two (both statistically significant at 
α = 0.01).  The negative correlation between evaluations of campaign finance law and 
political participation indicates that citizens who are dissatisfied with our current system 
are more likely to be politically active.  This does not seem to lend support to the 
Supreme Court’s contention that dissatisfaction with government would lead to 
 30 
withdrawal from political life.  However, the strongly positive relationship between 
political interest and political participation is well-supported by past literature.  Taken 
together, these results suggest that there is not a significant relationship between 
perceptions of the frequency of political corruption and political participation.  That 
being said, the significant relationship between evaluations of campaign finance laws and 
political participation suggests that changes in campaign finance law could have an 
influence on political behavior. 
 
Table 5. Results of second OLS model. 
Variable Coefficient (Standard Error) 
Intercept 0.3022 (0.4170) 
Perceptions of Frequency of Corruption 0.1621 (0.0867)  
Evaluation of Campaign Finance Laws -0.3179 (0.0559) *** 
Political Interest 0.7014 (0.0819) *** 
Gender -0.1941 (0.0963) * 
Race 0.3207 (0.1128) ** 
Education Level 0.0654 (0.0440) 
Income Level 0.1093 (0.0493) * 
Ideology 0.0738 (0.0451) 
***p < 0.01    **p < 0.05    *p < 0.10 
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DISCUSSION 
 Though they are in accord with past literature, one possible explanation for these 
contrary results is that the variables used are imperfect proxies for the concepts outlined 
in the appearance of corruption rationale.  More clearly, a test of the first stage of the 
appearance of corruption rationale requires determining the relationship between 
perceived size of campaign contributions and perceptions of corruption in government.  
One approach (as was done here) is to examine this at the individual level by determining 
whether citizens who perceive individual campaign contributions to be larger in size are 
more likely to perceive higher incidences of corruption in government.  However, it is 
also possible to test this hypothesis at the aggregate level; longitudinal data could be used 
to determine if perceptions of corruption changed as legislation capping individual 
campaign contributions was introduced or modified.  However, this latter experimental 
design rests on the unfounded assumption that citizens are in fact aware of changes in 
campaign finance regulation.  Variation in state-level election laws might also reveal if 
individual campaign contributions limits do in fact influence perceptions of corruption, 
yet this design also relies on that same tenuous assumption. 
The second stage of the appearance of corruption argument posits that as 
perceptions of corruption increase, indicators of democratic health should decrease.  One 
approach is to determine if individuals who perceive poor democratic health are more 
likely to perceive corruption in government.  However, the use of perceptions of 
democratic health as the dependent variable raises an endogeneity problem; it is 
theoretically plausible that perceptions of democratic health could influence perceptions 
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of corruption, creating a causal loop between the independent and dependent variables.  
Thus objective measures of democratic health, such as turnout levels, political 
participation measures, or civic engagement measures, would seem to be a better option.  
It is important to note, however, that the specific argument put forth in Buckley v. Valeo 
rests on perceptions of corruption among the population; while objective indicators might 
offer a more detailed picture of the attitudes referred to in the opinion, subjective 
indicators are more true to the argument itself. 
Therefore, while taking into account both the Supreme Court’s vague conception 
of corruption and the measurement challenges associated with surveys concerning 
campaign finance, this study found little evidence that the Court’s appearance of 
corruption rationale is reflective of political reality.  This adds to prior empirical evidence 
suggesting perceptions of corruption have little discernable effect on mass political 
behaviors.  The sparse evidence in favor of the appearance of corruption rationale also 
calls into doubt the Court’s justification for upholding the constitutionality of limits on 
individual campaign contributions, leading us to consider where the Constitutional 
foundations of campaign finance regulations might then be found.  Furthermore, this 
insight on the relationship between perceptions of corruption and political behavior also 
touches on the wide-ranging question of which elite behaviors do in fact have 
quantifiable effects on mass behavior. 
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CONCLUSION 
 In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court ushered in a new era of campaign finance 
jurisprudence with their rationale for limiting individual campaign contributions.  
Specifically, the Court argued that the mere appearance of corruption prompted by large 
campaign contributions was enough to spark behavioral changes in citizens that 
undermined overall democratic health.  I first provided an introduction to the unique 
measurement and estimation challenges that arise in the context of a complete evaluation 
of the Court’s hypothesis.  I then used novel survey data with structural equation 
modeling and OLS to construct a robust test of that hypothesis while also accounting for 
measurement imperfections and controlling for factors affecting perceptions of 
corruption. As suggested by past literature, a number of fit measures and regression 
results indicated that the particular hypotheses derived from the appearance of corruption 
rationale were not supported by the data, suggesting that the Supreme Court’s rationale 
for capping individual campaign contributions is unfounded.  
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Appendix A: Complete Survey Instrument 
This survey is a research study conducted by: 
  
Nitya Rao 
Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin 
Nitya.Rao@utexas.edu 
  
The purpose of the study is to understand the relationship between political attitudes 
concerning campaign finance regulations.  This survey should take approximately 
five minutes to complete.  If you agree to participate, you will be asked a series of 
questions concerning your political attitudes and provide some basic demographic 
information. 
  
Risks and Benefits: The risks posed by participation in this survey do not exceed those 
presented by everyday life.  You will be compensated for finishing the survey but 
will not otherwise receive any benefits for your participation.  You may withdraw 
from participation in the survey at any time. 
  
Privacy and Confidentiality: This survey will not ask for any individual identifying 
information, and all data collected will be stored in a secure and confidential 
manner.  Only the principal investigator and authorized members of the Individual 
Review Board at the University of Texas at Austin will have access to research 
records. 
  
Questions and Contact Information: If you have any questions about this study or 
would like additional information, please contact the principal investigator at the 
email address listed above.  If you have concerns about this study, please contact 
the Institutional Review Board at orsc@uts.cc.utexas.edu. 
  
Statement of Consent: I have read the above information in its entirety and consent to 
participate in the survey. 
• Yes 
• No 
 
You will see a series of questions gauging your political attitudes.  Please select the 
response that best reflects your answer to each question asked.  You will also be asked to 
provide basic demographic information at the end of the survey. 
 
1. How often can other people be trusted?  
• Almost always 
• Frequently 
• Half of the time 
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• Occasionally 
• Very rarely 
2. Do you think your representatives’ actions are always honest and ethical?  
• Almost always 
• Frequently 
• Half of the time 
• Occasionally 
• Very rarely 
3. Does the federal government waste tax money?  
• Almost always 
• Frequently 
• Half of the time 
• Occasionally 
• Very rarely 
4. How often can you trust the federal government to act in the benefit of all 
citizens?  
• Almost always 
• Frequently 
• Half of the time 
• Occasionally 
• Very rarely 
5. Do you think that the federal government is mostly concerned with a few 
powerful interests or with the welfare of all citizens?  
• A few powerful interests  
• Welfare of all citizens 
6. How many people in the federal government are corrupt?  
• Almost all 
• Most  
• Roughly half 
• Some 
• Very few 
7. Do you think that elections cause the federal government to attention to what 
citizens think? 
• Almost always 
• Frequently 
• Half of the time 
• Occasionally 
• Very rarely  
8. How would you evaluate the amount of money you have to pay in taxes? 
• Too much 
• About right 
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• Not enough 
9. How would you evaluate President Obama’s performance?  
• Strongly approve 
• Mostly approve 
• Neutral 
• Mostly disapprove 
• Strongly disapprove 
10. How would you describe the current state of the country’s economy?  
• Very good 
• Good 
• Neither good nor bad 
• Bad 
• Very bad 
11. How do you think the country’s economy has changed in the past year?  
• Improved  
• Stayed the same 
• Worsened 
12. How do you think the country’s economy will change in the next twelve months?  
• Improve 
• Stay the same 
• Worsen  
13. To what extent do you consider the amount of money a candidate has raised when 
deciding whether or not to vote for them?  
• A lot  
• A little 
• Don’t consider 
14. To what extent do you consider the sources of a candidate’s campaign funds when 
deciding whether or not to vote for them? 
• A lot  
• A little 
• Don’t consider 
15. What percentage of the average US Senate candidate’s funds do you think come 
from interest groups?  
• 0% - 19% 
• 20% - 39% 
• 40% - 59% 
• 60% - 79% 
• 80% - 100% 
16. What percentage of the average US Senate candidate’s funds do you think come 
from individual contributions?  
• 0% - 19% 
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• 20% - 39% 
• 40% - 59% 
• 60% - 79% 
• 80% - 100% 
17. How much would you support a reform that limits candidates for federal office to 
campaign funds from a public financing system?  
• Strongly support 
• Moderately support 
• Neither for nor against 
• Moderately against 
• Strongly against 
18. How much would you support a reform that mandates full disclosure but allows 
unlimited campaign contributions by individuals?  
• Strongly support 
• Moderately support 
• Neither for nor against 
• Moderately against 
• Strongly against 
19. How much would you support a reform that prohibits third parties from spending 
money on campaign communications?  
• Strongly support 
• Moderately support 
• Neither for nor against 
• Moderately against 
• Strongly against 
20. What priority would you assign to campaign finance reform?  
• Very high 
• High 
• Medium 
• Low 
• Very low 
21. How often do you think that corruption occurs within the US Congress?  
• Frequently 
• Occasionally 
• Rarely 
22. Which group or factor would you identify as the primary influence on a 
Congressman’s actions?  
• Personal ideology 
• Party preferences 
• Constituency preferences 
• Campaign contributors 
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• Lobbyists 
• Interest groups 
23. How often do you think that Congressmen give extra time or consideration to 
campaign contributors?  
• Almost always 
• Frequently 
• Half of the time 
• Occasionally 
• Very rarely  
24. How much of the time can you trust the federal government to do what is right?  
• Almost always 
• Frequently 
• Half of the time 
• Occasionally 
• Very rarely  
25. What priority do you think should be given to reforms aimed at reducing 
corruption in the US Congress?  
• Very high 
• High 
• Medium 
• Low 
• Very low 
26. Do you think the country is headed in the right or wrong direction? 
• Right direction 
• Wrong direction 
27. To what extent do you think that the federal government responds to the wants 
and needs of people like you?  
• Almost always 
• Frequently 
• Half of the time 
• Occasionally 
• Very rarely  
28. Do substantial campaign contributions from individuals unduly influence elected 
officials’ actions?  
• Almost always 
• Frequently 
• Half of the time 
• Occasionally 
• Very rarely  
29. Do substantial campaign contributions from interest groups unduly influence 
elected officials’ actions?  
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• Almost always 
• Frequently 
• Half of the time 
• Occasionally 
• Very rarely  
30. Do all citizens have an equal ability to impact an election, or do wealthy citizens 
have a greater ability?  
• All citizens have an equal ability. 
• Wealthy citizens have a greater ability. 
31. How would you evaluate the impact of money on the electoral process?  
• Too much influence 
• Appropriate amount of influence 
• Not enough influence 
32. How would you evaluate the current system of campaign finance regulation in the 
U.S.? 
• Very good 
• Good 
• Neither good nor bad 
• Bad 
• Very bad 
33. How would you evaluate your support for the current campaign finance 
regulations that permit third-parties affiliated with a campaign to spend unlimited 
amounts of money on campaign advertisements?  
• Very high 
• High 
• Medium 
• Low 
• Very low 
34. Do you think that campaign contributions are a form of free speech protected by 
the First Amendment?  
• Yes 
• No 
35. Do you think that one political party benefits more from the current system of 
campaign finance regulation than another? 
• The Republican Party benefits more. 
• The Democratic Party benefits more. 
• Both parties benefit equally. 
• Neither party benefits. 
36. How often do you think that Congress-members look out for the interests of 
special interest groups or wealthy citizens over the interests of all citizens?  
• Almost always 
 40 
• Frequently 
• Half of the time 
• Occasionally 
• Very rarely  
 
You will now be asked to answer a number of questions about your demographic 
characteristics.  Please select the option that best reflects your answer to the questions 
asked. 
 
1. Select the option that best identifies your gender. 
• Male 
• Female  
2. Select the option that best identifies your race.  
• Caucasian (non-Hispanic) 
• Hispanic 
• African-American 
• Asian-American 
• Native American 
• Other 
3. Please select the option that best identifies your partisan affiliation.  
• Strong Democrat 
• Moderate Democrat 
• Independent, leaning Democrat 
• Independent 
• Independent, leaning Republican 
• Moderate Republican 
• Strong Republican 
4. How would you describe your political ideology?  
• Very liberal 
• Liberal 
• Moderate 
• Conservative 
• Very conservative  
5. How interested are you in politics? 
• Very  
• Somewhat 
• Not at all 
6. Select the option that contains your yearly income.  
• Less than $10,000 
• $10,000 to $19,999 
• $20,000 to $29,999 
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• $30,000 to $39,999 
• $40,000 to $49,999 
• $50,000 to $59,999 
• $60,000 to $69,999 
• $70,000 to $79,999 
• $80,000 to $89,999 
• $90,000 to $99,999 
• $100,000 to $149,999 
• $150,000 to $199,999 
• $200,000 to $250,000 
• More than $250,000 
7. How old are you? Please enter your age to the closest year. 
8. What is the highest degree you have received?  
• None 
• High school diploma or equivalent 
• Associate’s degree 
• Bachelor’s degree 
• Master’s degree 
• Professional school degree 
• Doctoral degree 
9. Have you participated in any of the following activities over the past four years? 
• Attend a political meeting or rally  
• Participate in a demonstration or protest 
• Discuss politics with friends and family 
• Contact elected representatives 
• Contact newspapers or magazines for political causes 
• Petition 
• Vote in a primary election 
• Volunteer for a political campaign 
10. If you had to make a choice, how would you describe your current socio-
economic status?  
• Lower class 
• Working class 
• Middle class 
• Upper-middle class 
• Upper class 
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Appendix B: Additional Survey Information 
The survey was written and fielded by the author of this paper and funded by a 
Patricia Witherspoon Research Award granted to the author by the Annette Strauss 
Institute for Civic Life at the University of Texas at Austin.  This survey received 
approval from the Institutional Review Board at the University of Texas at Austin.  Proof 
of approval can be provided upon request.  No sampling frame was used in the 
implementation of this study.  As respondents actively chose to complete the survey, 
response rates are not available for this study. 
 Workers must be at least 18 years of age to participate in MTurk’s labor market.  
Furthermore, the survey was only available to workers located in the United States.  Each 
respondent was only permitted to take the survey one time; MTurk kept record of each 
worker’s Internet Protocol (IP) address, and workers with the same IP address were not 
permitted to re-enter the survey once it was completed.  Respondents received $0.25 in 
compensation for taking the survey.   
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Appendix C: Distribution of Survey Variables 
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